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Abstract
Despite the considerable growth of Information Systems (IS) outsourcing in recent years, this trend is
still the object of strong criticism. This study has as its aim to show the main risks computer
outsourcing entails for the largest Spanish firms. In order to achieve that aim, we have reviewed the
previous literature on this topic and later analysed the results of a survey covering 5,000 firms.
According to the firms under analysis, the main concern in relation to IS outsourcing is the excessive
dependence on the provider this type of contract may generate. Nevertheless, some characteristics of
firms (mainly their size) somehow determine what risks are seen as the most relevant. The conclusions
also suggest that total outsourcing can turn out to be a very dangerous strategy, mainly due to the
dependence it creates. This is why IS managers should consider other alternatives such as having
multiple providers or resorting to selective outsourcing.
Keywords: Management of IS, Outsourcing, Risks, Survey.
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INTRODUCTION

Information Systems (IS) outsourcing has experienced a remarkable growth in recent years (Baldwing,
Irani and Love, 2001:16; Currie, 2000:241; Kern, Willcocks and Van Heck, 2002:47; Lacity and
Willcocks, 1998:363; Marchand and Jacobsen, 2001:315; McLellan, Marcolin and Beamish,
1995:300; Palvia, 1995:265; Shepherd, 1999:64; Udo, 2000:422); some authors even suggest we find
ourselves in the Outsourcing Era (King, 2001:15) and, judging by the forecast data offered by some
computer market analysts, this growth will continue in the near future (The Yankee Group, 2003).
These services are not only growing, but also spreading geographically, from North America, the
United Kingdom and Australia to Western Europe, South America and some countries in Southeast
Asia, like Japan (Moran, 1999:1). What is more, the scope and range of services being outsourced are
increasing too (Currie, 1998:169), as is shown by the promotion of BPO (Business Process
Outsourcing), ASP (Applications Service Providers), Global Outsourcing, Web and E-business
Outsourcing.
However, the unique nature of Information Technology (IT) places customers in a position of
disadvantage with respect to IS outsourcing providers (Lacity and Willcocks; 1995:226-228).
Customers often lack experience in the signature of outsourcing contracts. This is not the case for
providers (Ketler and Walstrom; 1993:457), who enjoy a much better position due to this information
asymmetry.
This is why the present paper seeks to identify the risks perceived to be the most relevant in IS
outsourcing, from the customer’s point of view. With that aim in mind, we will firstly review the
literature on IS outsourcing risks, after which we will show the methodology, the main results and the
conclusions of an empirical piece of work based on a survey carried out among the IS managers of the
largest Spanish firms. The results will not only tell us the level of importance of the said risks in the
firms under analysis, but also will help us to try and determine whether or not those risks are
conditioned by the outsourcing level or the diverse characteristics of firms (like sector and size) and
their IS departments.
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OUTSOURCING RISKS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS LITERATURE

IS outsourcing is a managerial decision that entails various risks and problems, so much so that
numerous authors have identified an associated risk for each advantage suggested. Firstly, we can
encounter problems derived from the dependence this service generates. The dependence results from
the fact that, in practice, firms find it difficult to quantify and define the information services they
need, and besides, those services tend to evolve over time. Therefore, if these services had not been
agreed in the original contract, they would have to be charged with an additional rate, thus increasing
the total costs (Fowler and Jeffs, 1998:121); or internal improvements in the customer firm’s IS might
be neglected (Glass, 1996:90). This is why Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b:76) state that external
providers are not strategic partners, as the interest in profits is not shared; in other words, when the
customer’s costs increase, the same happens to the provider’s profits. Along the same lines, Guterl
(1996:80) suggests that providers would rather customers had more additional costs, not fewer.
The loss of critical skills and competences is another relevant problem. When a service is outsourced, the
customer loses his understanding of the service over time. Even though the provider supplies innovative
services to the customer, a large part of the new knowledge required remains in the hands of the provider
and cannot be transferred to the customer. Worse than that, the firm can lose its capacity to be up to date
with technological breakthroughs (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:231). Therefore, the customer needs to
retain certain know-how and internal capacities in both technical and managerial areas so as to be able to
handle the outsourcing relationship properly (Willcocks and Lacity, 1999:177). Retaining these capacities
is the best way to identify and evaluate potential outsourcing risks and also to perform practices that can
mitigate those risks (Willcocks, Lacity and Kern, 1999:310).

An additional difficulty has to do with the qualification of the provider’s staff’s. Although in theory
outsourcing provides access to technical knowledge and IS specialists’ expertise, what very often
happens in practice is that the firm which outsources is supported by the same staff as before (Fowler
and Jeffs, 1998:122; Glass, 1996:89), as these staff have been transferred from the customer firm to
the service providing firm. Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b:78) warn that many of the outsourcing firms
feel they have suffered losses in business knowledge and experience, because providers send their
most qualified workers to get new customers from other firms in the sector once they have achieved
the contract. Besides, providers hardly ever take the initiative when it comes to business strategies;
they prefer to follow specific instructions instead.
The provider’s lack of compliance with the contract is another possible risk. This problem is inherent
to any contract: whenever an agent performs tasks for a principal, the principal always runs the risk of
the agent not completing the task as expected or of being less vigilant than the principal would be
(Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:230). Besides, in the case of IS outsourcing, customers’ needs may
not be properly met, and an inadequate task priority may be established, above all because the provider
does not fully understand what the business is all about (Martinsons, 1993:21; Glass, 1996:90).
What is more, an unclear cost-benefit relationship may exist within IS outsourcing; after all,
performing a cost/benefit analysis for outsourcing is no easy matter. Taking into account all relevant
factors and translating them into monetary values is not easy either. For example, some issues include
determining how to compare and translate the potentially better service of an outsourcing vendor with
the service provided by the internal IS department and deciding how to measure in economic terms the
consequences of an outsourcing vendor failing to deliver products or delivering unacceptable products
(Gupta and Gupta, 1992:49). Before these difficulties, many firms admit that their decision to
outsource is only based on the costs of outsourcing, and not on its benefits (Clark, Zmud and McCray,
1995:230), seeing as costs exclusively those fixed in the contract.
Although one of the main theoretical objectives of outsourcing is to control IS costs or flexibilise them
by making them become variable, outsourcing may have hidden costs, such as those derived from
dismissing or transferring staff, the transfer of licences by software vendors, etc. These costs are
mainly due to ambiguities in the contract, i.e. failing to define present and future IT requirements;
applying poor recruitment practices; not allowing providers to obtain reasonable profits and being
unable to create mechanisms that protect prices in case of contingency (Willcocks, Lacity and
Fitzgerald, 1995:339). Summing up, the hidden costs of outsourcing could be the following
(Barthélemy; 2001:61-66): a) vendor search and contracting - many enterprises underestimate the
expense associated with identifying and evaluating suitable IT vendors, selecting a finalist, and
negotiating as well as drafting the contract, b) transitioning to the vendor – it can take months before
the vendor knows as much as the internal IT department, c) costs related to provider management which imply, amongst other things, verifying that IT vendors fulfil their contractual obligations,
bargaining with them, and finally, negotiating any contract changes required, and d) transition costs
after outsourcing – these costs come from switching vendors or resuming IT activities internally.
We should mention possible security issues, above all when a provider has to serve several direct
competitors, which means having to keep confidentiality about the information corresponding to all of
them (Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1994:38; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a:24). The security of the IS
services outsourced will depend on the providing firm, which is why policies and procedures must be
negotiated within the outsourcing contract to ensure that IS security objectives (effectiveness,
efficiency, adequacy, integrity, validity, authorisation, privacy) continue to be fulfilled (Fink, 1994:5).
Another risk is the oft-mentioned irreversibility of the outsourcing decision (Fink, 1994:5), especially
if the user has got rid of the technical and human infrastructure needed to reconstruct his IS in house
(Barthélemy, 2001:67; Fowler and Jeffs, 1998:121). There are three main reasons for this
irreversibility: the high costs involved in reconstructing the IS department, the difficulty to attract the
necessary staff and the amount of time required (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:231).

Outsourcing generates various staff-related problems; the customer firm will therefore meet the
possible opposition of the IS staff, who see outsourcing as a threat to their working position. IS staff
may find themselves before a dismissal, a retraining period, or a transfer to the service providing firm
(Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1994:38). This uncertain situation creates anxiety and a feeling of
insecurity, which may result in a decrease of employees’ productivity during the period prior to the
signature of the contract or even after the contract has been signed (Palvia, 1995:270).
When only some staff members are transferred from the customer firm to the provider firm, it has been
checked that problems related to lack of motivation arise among those staying in the customer firm.
These professionals probably feel offended because they think they are not good enough to belong to a
specialist firm like the computer service provider (Willcocks and Fitzgerald, 1996:287). On the other
hand, those who are transferred from one firm to another may suffer various changes that can go from
their seniority or any other favourable condition to the need to adapt to a new corporate culture. The status
of the IT executives who remain in the customer firm usually improves (Martinsons, 1993:21), but they
must reorient their competence (Corbett; 1994:20-21), focussing on external relationships management
and dedicating much less time to operations management.
Finally, we can refer to the inability to adapt to new technologies. In theory, access to leading-edge
technology is a persuasive argument in support of IS outsourcing, as a firm can enjoy the latest
technology without the lead time that is customary for in-house development (Palvia, 1995:269).
Outsourcing vendors can quickly adapt to machine upgrades and new software releases (Lacity and
Hirschheim, 1993.a:20). In practice, though, if providers do not find benefits in the adoption of new
technologies, they could become reluctant to adopt them, in an attempt to make the service they offer
as profitable as possible. What is more, if the outsourcing contract does not include a clause relative to
the future technological evolution, that evolution will not be completed (Glass, 1996:90).
All these risks will become greater if customers opt for total outsourcing. Therefore, IS managers
should consider other alternatives such as resorting to selective outsourcing or outsourcing with
multiple providers (Currie, 1998:171). With selective outsourcing, firms can retain the internal knowledge
required to handle the outsourcing provider or even to revert the outsourcing process. With the option of
multiple providers, the customer firm can negotiate outsourcing contracts with multiple providers
differentiated by competence, experience and market position (Cross, 1995:96), thus making the different
providers’ skills complementary. However, even these strategies have their risks; Cross (1995:96), for
instance, points out that it is difficult to manage and coordinate the work of several providers. In turn, Loh
and Venkatraman (1992:11) suggest that it is not easy to specify each provider’s responsibilities either,
especially when the outsourced processes are interdependent. Finally, Currie and Willcocks (1998:141)
reminds us that the management and coordination of multiple contracts are very time-consuming.
Other practices that would surely help to reduce risks have to do with fully understanding the nature of
the work outsourced, signing short-term contracts, demanding up-to-date documentation about those
contracts and also with the customer’s ability to retain the skills and competences needed to ensure
that contracts add value to profits (Earl, 1996:24; Currie, 1998:179, Hurst and Hanessian; 1995:107).

3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

After identifying IS outsourcing risks in the literature, we will explore how these risks apply to the
largest Spanish firms. The reason why we decided that our target population should be formed by the
largest firms was that, in the absence of previous data about IS outsourcing in Spain, those large firms
could be expected to have accumulated more knowledge and experience in this field. This reason is
similar to the one provided by Fink and Shoeib (2003:305) in their paper. In order to identify the
largest firms, we used the directory Las 5.000 mayores empresas (The 5,000 largest firms) of
Actualidad Económica magazine, which has been collated with other databases largely used in
business studies like Duns and Bradstreet’s 50.000 Principales Empresas Españolas (the 50,000 main
Spanish firms). Among the 5,000 Spanish firms with the highest sales, we looked up on the list of the
first database those which shared the same telephone number and address, as this was a symptom

revealing that both the IS manager and the structure itself could coincide. Once that information was
known to us, we decided to send the questionnaire only to the firm which, having the same telephone
number and address as others, had the highest sales.
In this way, we eliminated 584 firms, after which our final database consisted of 4,416 firms, to which
was sent a questionnaire along with a stamped addressed envelope for the questionnaire to be returned.
We had to face the handicap that field studies based on surveys about IS outsourcing do not
proliferate, case studies being more common (Aubert, Rivard and Patry; 1996; Baldwing, Irani and
Love, 2001; Huber, 1993; Kern and Willcocks, 2000; 2002; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a; 1993b;
Lacity and Willcocks, 1997; Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1996; Loebbecke and Jelassi, 1999;
McLellan, Marcolin and Beamish, 1995; Palvia, 1995; Willcocks and Choi, 1995; Willcocks,
Fitzgerald and Lacity, 1996; Willcocks, Lacity and Kern, 1999). However, on the basis of the previous
literature about this matter, we prepared a questionnaire draft, which was later subjected to a pilot test
and a pre-test. 5 out of the 19 questions in the final questionnaire were used in this study, as this paper
is part of a larger empirical study dealing with a wide range of aspects related to IS outsourcing. The
questionnaire’s addressees were the IS managers of the firms included in the final database.
The information obtained through the questionnaire was later elaborated on using the statistical
program SPSS for Windows and then treated with univariant and multivariant statistical methods.
Table 1 shows the study specifications, where we can see that 357 valid answers were obtained, i.e. an
8%. This percentage is acceptable if we bear in mind that obtaining answers in surveys carried out
among IS executives is problematic. This is due to the fact that the rapid technological change, the
considerable investments firms have made on IT, and the great interest aroused by outsourcing have
made these executives become the target of many surveys (Poppo and Zenger, 1998:862).
Scope
Population
Sample size
Sampling error
Survey date

Table 1.
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Spain
4,416 largest Spanish businesses (by sales)
357 valid answers (8%)
5%
June-October, 2001

Study technical specifications.

RESULTS

As for the presentation of the results obtained in the empirical study, we will firstly refer to some
general features of firms, such as their outsourcing level or the size and characteristics of their IS
department. This will allow us to check, in the following subsection, what risks are involved in
outsourcing, and whether or not those risks are influenced by the said features.
4.1

General characteristics of firms

IS outsourcing is undoubtedly a widespread phenomenon, since only 14.3% of the interviewed firms
have outsourced no IS services (Table 2). The outsourcing level variable will help us to check if the
higher or lower outsourcing level of firms conditions their decision to outsource IS services. An even
distribution of firms with outsourcing levels above and below the mean is possible thanks to the way
in which this variable was designed.
The size of a firm can be measured by the number of employees and its sales. Table 2 shows that the
interviewed firms are large with respect to these two variables, since the lowest percentages are found
in the smallest firms (only 6.2 % of them have between 0 and 50 employees and 10.1% turn over up to
5 billion pesetas, ca. 30 million €.). Most of the interviewed firms belong to the Industrial sector
(58.8%), followed by the Service sector with one third of the firms. We have detected that 8.1% of the
answers came from firms belonging to the Financial and Insurance Institutions sector.

N
No
Outsourcing
Yes
Below the mean
Outsourcing Level
Above the mean
0-50
51-500
Staff
More than 500
Lost
Up to 5
Sales (billion
More than 5 up to 50
pesetas*)
More than 50
Lost
Industry
Sector
Services
Financial and insurance institutions
1-10 Employees
11-100 Employees
IS Staff
101-400 Employees
Lost
0-4
Budget Percentage 5-10
allocated to IS
11-30
Lost

51
306
175
182
22
202
132
1
36
227
93
1
210
118
29
240
96
5
16
133
61
18
145

%
14.3
85.7
49.0
51.0
6.2
56.6
36.9
0.3
10.1
63.6
26.0
0.3
58.8
33.1
8.1
67.2
26.9
1.4
4.5
37.2
17.1
5.1
40.6

* 1€ is 166.386 pesetas

Table 2.

General characteristics of firms.

Despite the size of firms, IS departments do not have a large staff volume. As is shown in Table 2,
most firms have between 1 and 10 employees, and only very few have IS departments with more than
100 employees. The percentage of their total budget allocated by firms to IS tends to be quite low too:
most firms dedicate between 0 and 4% of their budgets to IS, and only very few dedicate more than to
11% to this department, the maximum budget percentage allocated to IS being 30% (we must point
out that the question referring to the percentage of the budget dedicated to IS was the least answered
one in the whole survey, which means that answers or results regarding this aspect must be treated
with caution). In short, both the IS department staff size and the budget percentage dedicated to this
function prove that, regardless of firm size, only few human and/or financial resources are assigned to
these areas.
4.2

Outsourcing risks

Table 3 shows the risks involved in IS outsourcing. We must say that, in the corresponding question,
and following the lines of previous studies (Collins and Millen, 1995:9), interviewees were asked to
specify the three risks they considered to be the most important out of a list that had previously been
given to them. That list was based on the review of the literature presented in section 2 of this paper1.
Dichotomic variables consequently appeared, with a zero value when a specific risk was not
mentioned and a one value when it was. N stands for the number of times interviewees placed a
particular risk among the three most important ones.
The excessive dependence on the provider this contract may generate is very clearly identified as the
main obstacle. Other relevant -although much less often mentioned- drawbacks are the possible loss of
competence on the part of the customer and the dubious qualification level of the provider’s staff.
Curiously, the last problem in order of importance is the provider’s inability to adapt to new
1

The order in which we presented the said risks in section 2 is identical to the ranking shown in Table 3, which makes it easier to establish a
relationship between the theoretical review and the results obtained.

technologies. In other words, doubts do not refer to technical aspects, but to the provider’s personal
(human) characteristics. Another relatively surprising result has to do with the fact that the potential
opposition of the IS service staff is one of the least valued risks, even though the outsourcing contract
may put those employees’ jobs in danger.
Risks
An excessive dependence on the provider
Loss of critical skills and competences
Qualification of the provider’s staff
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract
Unclear cost-benefit relationship
Hidden costs in the contract
Security issues
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Possible IS staff opposition
Inability to adapt to new technologies

Table 3.

N
189
112
110
101
94
90
63
30
22
19

% valid
61.8
36.6
35.9
33.0
30.7
29.4
20.6
9.8
7.2
6.2

Rank
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th

Outsourcing risks.

We then carried out another series of tests which sought to clarify whether or not these risks were
closely related to firm characteristics. In first place, and regarding the relationship between
outsourcing level and outsourcing risks, we can identify three risks that are unarguably dependent on
outsourcing level (see Table 4).
• The firms that outsource the most are also the ones that most fear the possible dependence on the
provider generated by outsourcing.
• The firms that outsource the most are also the ones that most fear the IS staff’s possible
opposition.
• They are also the most concerned about the potential security problems outsourcing may generate.

An excessive dependence
on the provider
Possible IS staff
opposition
Security issues

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Outsourcing level
Below the
Above the
mean
mean
61 (52.1%)
56 (47.9%)
63 (33.3%) 126 (66.7%)
123 (43.3%) 161 (56.7%)
1 (4.5%)
21 (95.5%)
105 (43.2%) 138 (56.8%)
19 (30.2%)
44 (69.8%)

Total
117 (100%)
189 (100%)
284 (100%)
22 (100%)
243 (100%)
63 (100%)

Hidden costs in the contract
Provider’s staff qualification
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Loss of critical skills and competences
Unclear cost-benefit relationship

Chi-square

Sign.

10.601

0.001

12.730

0.000

3.536

0.060*

0.014
0.346
1.489
0.394
2.650
0.670
3.041

0.904
0.556
0.222
0.530
0.104
0.413
0.081

*P=0.060.

Table 4.

Chi-square test: outsourcing level and outsourcing risks.

As for the influence of size on outsourcing risks, we firstly tried to see to what extent the number of
employees in the firm has a bearing on the development of those risks. We detected quite a few
statistical dependence relationships. Thus, firms with higher numbers of workers showed more
concern about the qualification of the providing firm’s staff, about the possible opposition to
outsourcing of their IS department’s staff, and finally about the unclear relationship between costs and
benefits. In contrast, firms with fewer workers were above all concerned about dependence on the
provider and potential security problems (see Table 5).

Provider’s staff
qualification
An excessive dependence
on the provider
Possible IS staff
opposition
Security issues

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Staff
Up to 500
From 500
132 (67.3%)
64 (32.7%)
58 (52.7%)
52 (47.3%)
58 (49.6%)
59 (50.4%)
132 (60.8%)
57 (30.2%)
184 (64.8%) 100 (35.2%)
6 (27.3%)
16 (72.7%)
144 (59.3%)
99 (40.7%)
46 (73.0%)
17 (27.0%)
144 (67.9%)
68 (32.1%)
46 (48.9%)
48 (51.1%)

Unclear cost-benefit
relationship
Hidden costs in the contract
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Loss of critical skills and competences

Table 5.

Total
196 (100%)
110 (100%)
117 (100%)
189 (100%)
284 (100%)
22 (100%)
243 (100%)
63 (100%)
212 (100%)
94 (100%)

Chi-square

Sign.

6.398

0.011

12.613

0.000

12.209

0.000

4.022

0.045

9.976

0.002

0.650
0.679
0.152
0.062
2.561

0.420
0.410
0.697
0.804
0.110

Chi-square test: staff and outsourcing risks.

We also identified some dependence relationships between the most frequent outsourcing risks and
firm sales (see Table 6). Firms with the highest sales are the ones which most fear the loss of critical
skills and competences, as well as the potential opposition of their staff. Instead, those with lower
sales are mostly concerned about the hidden costs of outsourcing contracts and the excessive
dependence on the provider. Therefore, the group of smaller firms (in terms of staff volume and sales)
especially fear excessive dependence on the provider, while greater firms show reluctance to outsource
due to their staff’s opposition.
Sales
Up to 15*
From 15*
89 (41.2%) 127 (58.8%)
58 (64.4%)
32 (35.6%)
47 (40.2%)
70 (59.8%)
100 (52.9%)
89 (47.1%)
103 (53.1%)
91 (46.9%)
44 (39.3%)
68 (60.7%)
142 (50.0%) 142 (50.0%)
5 (22.7%)
17 (77.3%)

Hidden costs in the
No
contract
Yes
An excessive dependence No
on the provider
Yes
Loss of critical skills and
No
competences
Yes
Possible IS staff
No
opposition
Yes
Provider’s staff qualification
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Security issues
Unclear cost-benefit relationship

Total
216 (100%)
90 (100%)
117 (100%)
189 (100%)
194 (100%)
112 (100%)
284 (100%)
22 (100%)

Chi-square

Sign.

13.747

0.000

4.698

0.030

5.423

0.020

6.084

0.014

0.840
0.130
0.004
0.992
0.043
1.636

0.359
0.719
0.952
0.319
0.835
0.201

*billion pesetas

Table 6.

Chi-square test: sales and outsourcing risks.

Outsourcing risks are the same for the different firms, regardless of the sector they belong to, as we
can see in Table 7. However, Table 8 shows that while firms with fewer staff in their IS department
are the ones that most fear an excessive dependence on the provider, those with a higher number of

employees are above all worried about the risk of losing critical skills and competences in their IS
department and about the unclear relationship between costs and benefits in IS outsourcing.

Hidden costs in the contract
Provider’s staff qualification
An excessive dependence on the provider
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Loss of critical skills and competences
Possible IS staff opposition
Security issues
Unclear cost-benefit relationship

Table 7.

Chi-square
2.286
0.975
0.181
1.099
0.198
1.765
2.227
0.024
1.320
4.679

Chi-square test: sector and outsourcing risks.
IS Staff
Up to 5
From 5
35 (31.0%)
78 (69.0%)
87 (48.3%)
93 (51.7%)
86 (46.0%) 101 (54.0%)
36 (34.0%)
70 (66.0%)
93 (45.8%) 110 (54.2%)
29 (32.2%)
61 (67.8%)

An excessive dependence No
on the provider
Yes
Loss of critical skills and No
competences
Yes
Unclear cost-benefit
No
relationship
Yes
Hidden costs in the contract
Provider’s staff qualification
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Possible IS staff opposition
Security issues

Table 8.

Sing.
0.319
0.614
0.914
0.577
0.906
0.414
0.328
0.988
0.517
0.096

Total
113 (100%)
180 (100%)
187 (100%)
106 (100%)
203 (100%)
90 (100%)

Chi-square

Sign.

8.609

0.003

4.027

0.045

4.739

0.029

1.364
0.765
0.262
0.275
0.584
0.944
0.303

0.243
0.382
0.609
0.600
0.445
0.331
0.582

Chi-square test: IS staff and outsourcing risks.

Finally, after studying the relationships between outsourcing risks and the percentage of its total
budget each firm allocates to IS, we checked that no statistical relationship exists; in other words, risks
are not directly related to that budget percentage, as can be verified in Table 9.

Hidden costs in the contract
Provider’s staff qualification
An excessive dependence on the provider
Provider’s lack of compliance with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Loss of critical skills and competences
Possible IS staff opposition
Security issues
Unclear cost-benefit relationship

Table 9.
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Chi-square
1.591
0.507
0.008
0.685
0.601
0.177
0.130
1.593
1.058
0.407

Sign.
0.207
0.476
0.927
0.408
0.438
0.674
0.719
0.207
0.304
0.523

Chi-square test: Budget percentage allocated to IS and outsourcing risks.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

IS outsourcing has become a widespread phenomenon worldwide, and is also very common among
large Spanish firms. Despite their large size (in terms of both sales and staff), and judging by the staff

volume of IS departments and the budget percentage allocated to IS activities, these firms do not
dedicate many resources to IS services.
The main obstacle mentioned by the largest Spanish firms in relation to IS outsourcing is the excessive
dependence on the provider this type of contract may generate. Other important fears, although less
significant than the previous one, would be the loss of competence the customer may suffer and the
dubious qualification of the provider’s staff. Curiously enough, the risk ranked lowest in importance is
the inability to adapt to new technologies, which suggests that doubts refer to providers’ personal or
human characteristics rather than to their technical skills. Another surprising result is the low ranking
for possible IS staff opposition, which clearly contrasts with the importance given to this factor in the
literature.
Nevertheless, we can find an explanation if we relate these risks to some of the characteristics of the
interviewed firms and their IS departments. Thus, it can be seen that the most important problem
involved in outsourcing (excessive dependence on the provider) is mainly associated with the firms
that outsource the most, are smaller (both in terms of sales and staff) and have fewer IS staff, whereas
larger firms outsourcing the most are particularly concerned about their own staff ’s opposition to this
type of contract. In the former case, it seems reasonable for smaller firms to have objections to this
potential dependence, since they have not so many resources available to abandon the provider and
look for other alternatives (like the internal reconstruction of their own IS department or the search for
new providers). In the latter case, it could be argued that firms which outsource the most and are
larger in size fear the opposition of their staff due to the large number of employees that might be
affected by outsourcing.
As for the loss of skills and competences, the risk ranked second in importance, it is the most frequent
among firms with more resources (in terms of sales and IS staff), which would mean that these firms’
most important concern is their own incompetence after outsourcing is introduced. On the other hand,
we can say that although there is clear evidence that outsourcing risks are determined by both
outsourcing level and certain characteristics related to firm size (sales, number of employees and IS
staff), it is also true that other characteristics, such as the activity sector or the budget percentage
allocated to IS, do not condition those risks.
Finally, we must point out that the outsourcing risks described in this paper should be taken into
account, both in business practice and in future theoretical developments, since all of them have found
some support, at least in the firms we have analysed. In order to reduce those risks, IS managers
should consider the possibility of not resorting to total outsourcing, choosing instead either selective
outsourcing or a multiple-provider approach, or even both at the same time. Another interesting
alternative would consist in the IS department’s facing up to outsourcing providers’ offers with a
benchmarking study. In any case, firms must be aware of the need to retain some specific key
knowledge in house if they really want the outsourcing relationship to work satisfactorily for the
customer.
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